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Placing the Run on Northern Rock 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The collapse of Northern Rock in 2007 was the first major run on a UK retail bank 
since 1866. The Northern Rock case is exemplary on two fronts. First, described at 
the time of its collapse as an example of an aggressive business model employed by 
naïve management, it is now clear that Northern Rock marked the beginning of and 
provides insights into the credit crunch and wider global banking crisis. Second, 
Northern Rock provides a distinct context - geographically and institutionally - from 
which to explore the banking crisis. The paper utilises management interviews, 
secondary literatures and an investigation of the wider impacts of the restructuring of 
Northern Rock to produce a reading from the perspective of a peripheral financial 
region. It contributes to attempts to understand financial geographies that range 
beyond the major international financial centres that often dominate debates in 
Economic Geography. 
 
 
Credit Crunch      Geographies of Finance      Demutualisation     Northern Rock 
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Placing the Run on Northern Rock   
 
1: Introduction 
  
We have involved ourselves in a colossal muddle, having blundered in the 
control of a delicate machine, the working of which we do not understand 
(Keynes, 1930; 1). 
 
[A] good knowledge of what happened in 1929 remains our best safeguard 
against the recurrence of the more unhappy events of those days (Galbraith 
1992; 28). 
 
Despite extensive research since the 1920s, this plea for greater knowledge and 
understanding of financial crises by two insightful commentators still remains 
relevant today in the aftermath of the credit crunch in 2007, the ensuing banking crisis 
and subsequent international recession. This paper aims to improve our understanding 
of the geography of financial crises through a case study of the run on Northern Rock, 
a mortgage bank based in North East England. The collapse of Northern Rock, one of 
the early high profile casualties of the credit crunch (Shin, 2009), was an iconic event: 
the first significant run on a UK retail bank since 1866, and a “small hinge” on which 
the economy and political fortunes turned (Cable, 2009; 8). Northern Rock’s 
problems were not unique, it’s combination of aggressive growth, minimisation of 
capital and significant funding risks were shared by many other institutions involved 
in the banking crisis (Onado, 2009). The company had much in common with 
institutions such as the Countrywide Financial Corporation and IndyMac (Independent 
Mortgage Corporation) Bank in the US, which like Northern Rock got into trouble by 
pursuing the popular originate and securitize business model of mortgage lending, and 
had also recently changed ownership and regulator (Eisenbeis and Kaufman, 2009). 
Northern Rock has become an “important episode in the history of bank failures”, and 
a “much analysed case study” of “virtually everything that can go wrong with a bank” 
(Bruno and Llewellyn, 2009; 11, 7). In this paper, we use Northern Rock as an 
empirical opportunity to tie down in a particular place the space of flows that 
characterise global finance - what Clark (2005) refers to as money flowing like 
mercury - and to recover some of the “lost geographies” (Wainwright, 2010; 780; Lee 
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et al, 2009) of the global financial crisis, analysing its impact from outside the dense 
financial concentrations that dominate our largest cities and academic debate.  
 
The paper contributes to the extensive literature on the role of banks in financial crises 
(see Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009; Johnson and Kwak, 2010). Studies have focused 
particularly on the Great Depression when banking crises were part of wider shocks to 
capitalist economies (Glyn, 2005; Gamble, 2009). Here, over-accumulation based on 
an unsustainable bubble or speculative mania was associated with an expansion of 
money and credit and a mob-based euphoria reflecting excessive optimism over the 
rate of growth and corporate profits. This continued until a slowdown in the rate of 
growth caused more cautious investors to sell, leading to a panic as the bubble burst 
and the process of growth unwound until confidence was restored (Kindleberger, 
1978; Kindleberger and Aliber, 2005). There are strong parallels here with the 
growing literature on the 2007-10 global financial crisis (Rajan, 2010; Davies, 2010; 
Soros, 2009; Wolf, 2009). However, such work, drawing broadly on Minsky’s 
analysis (1975), interprets apparent irrational exuberance as  the result of the 
institutional, regulatory and market arrangements developed during periods of 
stability which become ingrained in the behaviour of market agents and policy-
makers and produce instability (Dymski, 2010; Whalen, 2009; Wray, 2007). Thus, a 
widely accepted account of the proximate causes of the financial crisis suggests: 
 
An extended global credit boom … Rising savings and global imbalances led 
to low interest rates and a rise in borrowing inducing a ‘search for yield’ in 
financial markets … apparent reductions in macroeconomic uncertainty and 
strong competitive pressures to maintain returns encouraged investors and 
financial firms to take on ever greater risk … greater dependence upon 
wholesale and overseas funding and a rapid expansion in banks’ balance 
sheets. Rising sub-prime defaults ended this boom exposing vulnerabilities in 
the financial system (Bank of England, 2008; 7).  
 
Such narratives though valuable tend to reinforce the global and universal character of 
explanations for financial crisis, and a geographical perspective has the potential to 
provide a richer, deeper and more subtle understanding. Responding to Clark’s (2005; 
108) call to develop a “distinctive approach to global finance”, and drawing on earlier 
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Economic Geography literature (Corbridge et al 1994; Martin, 1999), several inter-
linked and geographically-rooted explanations of the financial crisis have developed 
linking it to over-exploitation in sub-prime housing markets in the US (Wyly et al, 
2010; Langley, 2009), and the long standing regulatory competition between major 
financial centres, especially London and New York, and the insular everyday 
geographies of finance that underpin them (French, Leyshon and Thrift, 2009). We 
are also beginning to develop a better understanding of the aftermath of the financial 
crisis via a more considered appreciation of the uneven consequences of the 
international recession (Tomaney, Pike and Rodriguez-Pose, 2010; Pike and Pollard, 
2010). Initial somewhat breathless descriptions of the credit crunch (Hallworth and 
Skinner, 2008) have given way to an appreciation of “the linkages between the local 
and global, between the space of places and the flow of spaces” (Aalbers, 2009; 34). 
Martin (2010; 5-6) emphasises the complex series of multi-scalar, ‘glocalised’ 
monetary-spaces in the financial crisis, where relational and functional monetary ties 
between places are simultaneously both compressed and stretched and “the local and 
global have become inextricably interwoven”. However, despite such insights, as 
Martin (2010) also acknowledges, a clearer interpretation is needed of the spatial 
logics and interconnections in the financial bubbles and crashes underpinning the 
contemporary financial crisis. Such work, building on the insights of the political 
economy-informed analysis of over-accumulation and restructuring in the 1980s and 
1990s (Massey, 1995; Smith, 1990), can show the ways in which financial instability 
is reflected in associated rounds of spatial restructuring.  
 
The paper adds to such geographical understandings of the ongoing financial crisis 
through a strategic-relational analysis (Jessop, 2001) of Northern Rock that integrates 
both the structural and strategic dimensions of institutional and individual behaviour 
to provide an analysis of the credit crunch from the perspective of a peripheral region.  
It makes two key arguments. First, while Northern Rock was initially described in 
2007 as a ‘placeless’ extreme example of a hyper-aggressive business model 
employed by a naive management — we argue instead, developing Minsky’s work, 
that the Northern Rock case exemplifies how two decades of weakening regulatory 
boundaries encouraged new regional actors to participate in a City of London-centred 
form of financial growth driven by securitization and extensive leverage. Given that 
differences in corporate ownership and governance significantly influence managerial 
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behaviour (Clark and Wójcik, 2007; Clark and Wojcik, 2003), we show how the 
demutualisation of Northern Rock, a former mutual building society, intensified the 
‘herd instinct’ among financial sector institutions during the banking crisis by 
increasing the convergence pressures towards plc isomorphism. Second, it is argued 
that Northern Rock is a profoundly geographical story of a regionally-embedded 
mutual institution, shaped by local elite interests and histories, being drawn into the 
wider financial sector and attempting to develop in North East England an extension 
of the City of London. Far from the local being simply a recipient of ‘global forces’, 
we argue that regional influences were important in its failure, and that the character 
of Northern Rock’s growth and decline strongly echoes previous rounds of investment 
and North East England’s place in wider spatial divisions of labour.  
 
We develop these arguments in a longitudinal analysis of Northern Rock’s history and 
evolution. While the value of such longitudinal analysis in Economic Geography is 
frequently stressed (Engelen and Faulconbridge, 2009), in practice it is rare to have an 
opportunity to study truly significant events as they unfold. In this case, the authors 
are able to analyse key events at Northern Rock based on a range of previous and 
contemporary evidence collected as they developed. In 1996, Northern Rock was 
interviewed as part of research on the building society industry (Marshall et al 1997) 
and was included in further research on the demutualisation of building societies in 
1998-9, involving interviews with 31 societies and 3 institutions that had converted to 
plc status (Marshall et al, 2003). An interview with Northern Rock also formed part of 
a Centre for Urban and Regional Development Studies survey of labour market trends 
in North East England (CURDS and GHK Consulting, 2004) and, finally, an 
evaluation of the regional economic impact of redundancies at Northern Rock 
included confidential interviews with the company in 2008-9 (Regeneris Consulting et 
al, 2010). 
 
Following this introduction, in part 2 we briefly reprise the main elements of ‘the run’ 
on Northern Rock, drawing on popular media and the Treasury Committee Report of 
2008. In part 3, we start to develop our alternative reading of Northern Rock’s travails 
by situating it within the history of deregulation and demutualisation in the UK 
financial sector, before refining the focus in part 4, to consider Northern Rock’s 
journey from a regional building society to becoming the UK’s 5th largest mortgage 
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bank. By way of conclusion, we draw out the wider implications of our case study for 
understanding financial bubbles and for demonstrating why geographies of finance 
matter.  
 
 
2: The run on Northern Rock 
 
If you had been asked in the spring of 2007 to nominate one company that 
summed up Britain’s successful transformation from a manufacturing to a 
service economy, Northern Rock would have been a reasonable choice. 
Originating as a self-help movement for artisans in the heavy industrial 
heartland of north-east England, it became an IT-enabled finance house, filling 
the vacuum left by that region’s industrial decline and offering well-paid jobs 
in modern air-conditioned offices to 6,000 employees. These children and 
grandchildren of miners and shipyard workers had learned new skills as 
members of Britain’s financial services army, an industry at the cutting edge 
of the country's new knowledge economy (Augar, 2009; 149). 
 
Leyshon and Thrift (1989) in their work on the ‘South goes North? Rise of the British 
Provincial Financial Centre’ speculated on the extent to which Northern Britain would 
participate in the finance-based growth that followed the ‘Big Bang’ deregulation of 
financial services in the UK in the early 1980s. As Augar’s quote indicates, with 
almost 90% of its employment in North East England (predominantly at its 
headquarters in Gosforth a suburb of Newcastle-upon-Tyne and a computer centre at 
Doxford Park in Sunderland), Northern Rock became “a symbol of the North East’s 
renaissance” (Elliot and Atkinson, 2008; 49), a post-Thatcherite exemplar of the 
modernisation of the region and its successful participation in a deregulated finance-
dominated economy. In short, it represented an example of the ‘South going North 
(East)’. As a bank, Northern Rock had grown rapidly in the 8 years prior to 2007, 
roughly trebling its share of the UK mortgage market, and in the first half of 2007 its 
gross lending of £19.3 billion and net lending of £10.7 billion represented 9.7% and 
19.9% of lending in the UK mortgage market (Official Journal of the European 
Union, 2007). Similarly, the company’s net interest income and profits before tax had 
increased substantially - by 270% and 250% respectively at current prices between 
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2000 and 2006. Northern Rock’s workforce also grew apace, an increase of 3,000 
employees in the period 2000-2007; although it went unremarked that this 
employment growth was largely in routine service work, comprising approximately 
one third call centre staff such as telesales and data processing, one third retail and 
commercial banking staff and the remainder in administration, processing, and 
general management predominantly supporting telebanking (CURDS and GHK 
Consulting, 2004). By 2007, in terms of employment and profits, Northern Rock was 
the 5
th
 largest UK mortgage bank, with approximately 6,600 staff and some 77 
branches and a balance sheet of £113.5 billion (Official Journal of the European 
Union, 2007).  
 
Northern Rock’s rapid growth and financial success enabled it to become a high 
profile charitable and corporate sponsor. Good causes were supported through the 
Northern Rock Foundation which had awarded grants totalling more than £190m by 
December 2007 (http://www.nr-foundation.org.uk). High profile sponsorship deals 
were also secured with Newcastle United Football Club, the Newcastle Falcons rugby 
union team, the Newcastle Eagles basketball team and Durham County Cricket Club. 
Northern Rock, “a symbol of brash Geordie self-confidence,” was apparently a profit-
machine working in the interests of both its outside investors and the local area; it was 
“genuinely popular in its own community” (Elliot and Atkinson, 2008; 48) and the 
regional press, especially the Newcastle Journal and Chronicle, was an enthusiastic 
supporter:   
 
Analysts wrote reports on it; the press analysed its results; and institutional 
shareholders developed relationships with the management, nudging them 
towards making bigger profits and paying higher dividends. Investment 
bankers made their way up to Newcastle, proposing deals and recommending 
sophisticated financial products ... Everything was now stacked up for a dash 
for growth: demanding shareholders, ambitious management and deal-hungry 
advisors (Augar, 2009; 151-2).  
 
So what went wrong with this example of the finance-based economy of the South 
spreading to North East England? 
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The official account of the events at Northern Rock, incisively summarised in the 
Treasury Committee’s (2008) report ‘The Run on the Rock’, is largely silent on both 
the geographical specificity and impact of key events. Northern Rock first came to 
attention when on 14
th
 September 2007 it requested financial support from the Bank 
of England. Once the facility became public knowledge this led to a depositor run on 
the bank as retail customers became concerned for the security of their savings. The 
then Chancellor of the Exchequer Alastair Darling guaranteed all existing deposits in 
Northern Rock on 17
th
 September 2007 and extended this guarantee several times to 
include all unsecured retail products and all obligations of the company by 18
th
 
December 2007 (Northern Rock, 2008; 4).  Following a protracted period of 
uncertainty during which the government searched for a private sector buyer, on 17
th
 
February 2008 the Chancellor took the dramatic step of announcing that Northern 
Rock would be taken into public ownership. Northern Rock’s (2008) Provisional 
Restructuring Plan agreed in return for c.£27 billion in public funding to establish a 
smaller, more focused and financially viable mortgage savings bank that could be 
returned to the private sector. The company was allowed to return to the mortgage 
market in February 2009, and in October of the same year the bank was re-organised 
into a savings arm and an asset management organisation containing its mortgages, 
and the latter merged with the mortgage book of Bradford and Bingley, another failed 
former mutual building society that had converted to a mortgage bank and was 
nationalised in September 2008. By June 2010, Northern Rock had approximately 
3,750 employees, and a further 650 redundancies were announced apparently to 
prepare the bank for a sale to the private sector in line with the new coalition 
government’s public deficit reduction plans. 
 
The Treasury Committee (2008) enquiry blamed Northern Rock’s failure on 
“reckless” growth (p.3), based on a “fatally flawed” (p.18) business strategy and an 
“extreme” (p.22) business model which relied excessively on wholesale markets for 
its mortgage lending, especially via mortgage-backed securities, covered bonds and 
medium and short-term unsecured funding, using the off-balance sheet vehicle 
Granite trust. By 2007, 75% of Northern Rock’s total funding, some £80.5 billion, 
was supplied by non-retail sources. The success of this funding model depended 
critically on the ability of the company to extract economic rents from the basic 
arbitrage of paying a lower interest rate on funds in the wholesale market than the 
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interest rate that it charged its mortgage customers, and raising money in the 
wholesale money markets to both repay its borrowing and conduct further lending. 
Furthermore, about half of Northern Rock’s borrowing had a maturity of less than one 
year which meant that it needed continuously to refinance making it particularly 
vulnerable to a loss of liquidity (Milne and Wood, 2008). Northern Rock’s margins 
came under pressure due to the changed interest rate environment, as the cost of credit 
increased following the announcement by the French bank BNP Paribas that three of 
its investment funds, linked to sub-prime residential mortgages in the US, were no 
longer able to value their financial instruments. This ultimately led to a freezing of the 
short-term money markets upon which Northern Rock relied, due to a breakdown in 
trust, and the ensuing ‘credit crunch’ triggered a liquidity crisis at the bank.  
 
The Treasury Committee (2008) focused on the Board of Directors as “the principal 
authors” (p.3) of the difficulties the company faced and the latter were pilloried in the 
public hearings of the Committee and on prime time national television as scapegoats 
of financial mismanagement. Regulators were taken to task for being “asleep on the 
job” (p.22), not scrutinising Northern Rock sufficiently closely (Financial Services 
Authority, 2008) and for confusion between the Financial Services Authority, 
responsible for the supervision of individual banks, the Bank of England primarily 
focused on monetary policy and financial stability and the Treasury in overall charge 
of the tripartite system of regulation. Other initial academic accounts (Llewellyn, 
2008; Keasey and Veronesi, 2008; Bruno and Llewellyn, 2009), confirmed and 
extended the conclusions of the Treasury Committee highlighting: weaknesses in 
Northern Rock’s  internal risk management including a lack of focus on liquidity and 
off-balance-sheet activities; the need for improvements in the stress testing of 
institutions and capital adequacy controls to address the procyclical character of 
Northern Rock’s lending; the fact that lessons from the earlier Savings and Loans 
crisis in the US had not been learned which would have resulted in improvements in 
the bankruptcy regime for troubled banks and enhanced depositor protection, both of 
which would have assisted in dealing with Northern Rock. The emerging consensus 
concluded that Northern Rock “expanded far too fast, heedless of the risks to which it 
was exposed. The inherent fragility of its balance sheet could not withstand the 
market’s shift away from lending to or buying from mortgage lenders after the 
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revelation of difficulties in the American sub-prime mortgage market” (Chick, 2008; 
123). 
 
 
3: Revisiting the collapse of Northern Rock: Demutualisation and financial-
spatial integration  
 
A throwaway line in the Treasury Committee’s ‘Run on the Rock’ report 
acknowledges that had Northern Rock remained a mutual building society (limited by 
regulation from drawing more than 50% of their funds from wholesale sources) the 
run on the bank would have been much less likely (Treasury Committee, 2008; 28). 
This insight draws attention to the links between the crisis at Northern Rock and the 
earlier demutualisation of the company, as part of a wider spatial integration of the 
UK financial sector. We argue these changes prepared the ground for the present 
financial crisis, and culminated in a regionally-based, demutualised, former building 
society in North Eastern England being drawn unsuccessfully into global financial 
circuits articulated through the City of London. We analyse this transformation below 
in strategic-relational terms (Jessop, 2001; Jessop and Oosterlynck, 2008), showing 
how changes in regulation and legislation selectively reinforced specific strategies by 
participants, and their context sensitive actions, in turn, exploited the strategic 
selectivity inscribed in legislative and regulatory changes (Jessop, 2006). We argue 
that initial state intervention changing regulation and legislation, created a strategic 
opportunity for powerful actors in the building society sector to create a new 
economic imaginary of an innovative and entrepreneurial style of business operation, 
based on a consensus that the plc form was the most appropriate model for mortgage 
lending, and the primary objective of management was to maximise shareholder value 
over a short-term time horizon. The analysis focuses on the importance of corporate 
strategies and strategists (Schoenberger, 1997), and the key role of managerial elites 
(Savage and Williams, 2008) in initiating change, following initial state intervention. 
The circulation of people and financial imaginaries, including securitisation know-
how, from the US to the UK, is also important as chronicled in Tett’s (2009) account 
of the role of a small group of managers linked to JP Morgan in developing the 
innovative credit derivatives that were implicated in the credit crunch, Leyshon and 
Pollard’s (2000) earlier account of the way in which banking organisation in the UK 
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was shaped by developments in the US and Wainwright’s (2009) analysis of the 
spread of US securitization expertise to London. In the context of close connections 
between business elites, policy-makers and regulators (Auger, 2009), individual 
actions inspired a change in corporate culture that produced a cycle of incremental 
regulatory and legislative adjustments to reduce constraints on building society 
management, which culminated in the larger building societies converting from 
mutual organisations owned by their customers to shareholder owned banks. A 
strategic-relational approach draws attention to the spatiotemporal nature of 
institutions and individual actors involved in this transformation in corporate culture, 
focusing on what Jessop (2001; 1231) calls “a) the temporalities and spatialities 
inscribed in (and reproduced through) specific forms and b) the differential temporal 
and spatial horizons of various actors and their capacities to shift horizons, modify 
temporalities and spatialities, jump scales, and so forth”. Thus, while it provides scope 
for individual actions to overflow or circumvent structural constraints, and this 
certainly played a role in the unintended outcomes of deregulation, crucially a 
strategic-relational approach also recognises how path dependencies develop where 
spatiotemporal institutional legacies shape current possibilities and options for 
development. Thus, we show that not only was the demutualisation of Northern Rock 
part of a wider spatial integration of the financial sector, but in a subsequent section 
we indicate Northern Rock’s location and development in the North East of England 
shaped its involvement in the more integrated financial world. 
 
Leyshon and Thrift (1997; 335-336) regard London as one of the “chief points of 
surveillance and scripting” for the global financial services industry, making sense of 
a mass of information about the financial sector, and a meeting place for “social 
interaction on an expanded scale”, providing the everyday human interaction and 
‘buzz’ that makes the financial sector tick. “[M]oney cultures”, “made up of people 
who position themselves in relation to the circulation of money and are also 
positioned by it” (Allen and Pryke, 1999; 65), form an important part of such financial 
centres and these are institutionalised behind the regulatory firewalls established 
between individual markets. Prior to the 1980s, the building society sector was a 
distinctive, relatively separate financial sub-market with its own money culture where 
regulatory and legislative boundaries, characterised as “restrictive practices, anti-
competitive mechanisms, and self-imposed constraints … performing the same role as 
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regulation in limiting risk by constraining competition” (Llewellyn, 1990; 16-17), 
were reinforced by spatial separation because societies were overwhelmingly based 
outside the City of London (69% of building assets controlled from head offices 
outside London in 1989 - Marshall et al 1997). Building societies had roots in the self-
help and co-operative movement that developed in the industrial regions of the UK 
during the 1800s, and as mutual organisations were owned by their customers who 
were also members of the society with a vote in its operation. As originally conceived 
in the 19
th
 century and reinforced in the 1962 Building Society Act, societies “were 
creatures of statute” and could only operate in the manner envisaged by legislation 
(Building Societies Association, 1983; 5). They performed a particularly strict form of 
‘originate and hold’ mortgage lending and were solely established for the purpose of 
raising funds from their members to provide mortgage advances to other members to 
purchase property. Since individual members only had one vote irrespective of the 
size of their financial stake, their influence on the organisation declined when 
societies expanded during the 20
th
 century, and management increasingly acted as the 
representatives of, or fiduciaries for, their members. This layer of professional 
managers also assumed control of the industry through their trade body, the Building 
Societies Association (BSA), which ‘recommended’ interest rates and levels of 
reserves and helped manage the industry as a collective (Talbot, 2010). With a BSA-
based cartel controlling interest rates and taking much of the responsibility for 
decision-making in the sector, a money culture developed among building society 
management characterised as an “accounting or legal mentality” (Marshall et al, 1997; 
274), and Birchall (2001; 6) recalls an old joke that, at that time, the stability in the 
industry was such managers followed “‘the rule of three’: they borrowed at 1%, lent 
at 2% and were ‘on the golf course by three’”. 
 
The legislative and institutional framework underpinning this distinctive money 
culture was transformed in the ‘Big Bang’ when, “[S]tate power was used to override 
those business interests hostile to radical reform” (Moran, 1991; 1), as part of a wider 
international neoliberal state strategy (Peck and Tickell, 2003; Tickell, 2000) to use 
market liberalisation to strengthen London’s role as an international financial centre 
(Gentle et al, 1994). Similar regulatory changes occurred in the United States at 
roughly the same time when thrifts, organisations with an ownership structure and 
history similar to the UK building societies, and restricted in the same way by the 
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compartmentalisation of the US financial sector to the provision of residential 
mortgages, were provided with an opportunity to diversify away from mortgage 
lending and to access  new sources of funding in the wholesale money markets. The 
thrift’s traditional mortgage-based business model regulated the interest rates thrift’s 
could offer to attract funds and their yields on long term mortgages were locked in at 
low, fixed rates. Their business model was undermined by inflation, rapidly rising 
interest rates and competition, and rather than close failing thrift’s, the government 
allowed them greater operating freedom, and improved depositor protection. Thrifts 
used government insured deposits to engage in speculative diversification into higher 
yield (and  higher risk) assets  such as land, real estate and construction in a narrow 
range of locations. The recession of the early 1980s and the ensuing write-down of 
real estate and other assets led to the collapse  of 1043 institutions with $500 billion in 
assets between 1986 and 1995, costing taxpayers $124 billion in financial support 
(Curry and Shibut, 2000). Extensive analysis has been conducted of this Savings and 
Loans crisis (White, 1991; Seidman, 1993), which according to Barth et al (2004) 
shows how deregulation can destabilise a sector, supervisors can struggle to adapt to 
changing circumstances and management with little previous appropriate business 
experience can make a mess of diversification into new areas. There are clear parallels 
between these events and demutualisation in the UK; however, given the focus of the 
paper on Northern Rock, we concentrate on regulatory and legislative changes in the 
latter country, and compare the outcomes with the Savings and Loans crisis in the US.  
 
UK deregulation cumulatively brought about the integration of the relatively self-
contained retail savings and mortgage markets and connected them to international 
capital markets (Table 1). Restrictions on banks entering the mortgage market were 
lifted between 1979 and 1981. The Wilson Committee (1980) had also concluded that 
the BSA’s prudential practices, by limiting interest rate competition, were anti-
competitive and discriminated against home buyers. The exemption of the sector from 
the Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1976 was, therefore, replaced by market 
competition. The 1986 Building Societies Act created the independent Building 
Societies Commission (incorporated into the Financial Services Authority in 2000) to 
replace the BSA as the regulator for the sector, and initiated a gradually loosening of 
the statutory framework under which the building societies operated. While mortgage 
advances remained the principle purpose of the societies, a list of additional activities, 
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including a wide range of retail banking, investment and estate agency services were 
permitted which enabled them to compete more directly with banks in retail financial 
markets. Crucially, the 1986 Act regularised the ability of building societies to borrow 
on wholesale markets up to 20% of their total deposits and this was extended to 50% 
in 1997.  
 
The reduction of these barriers to competition in the 1980s and 1990s destabilised the 
‘mutual’ money culture of societies — including Northern Rock  — as they were 
gradually drawn into a City of London-based culture of “heightened” and “fast” risk” 
(Allen and Pryke, 1999; 65; also see Thrift, 2001; Clark et al 2004; Pryke and Allen, 
2000; Pryke and Lee, 1995). During the 1980s and 1990s larger societies recruited 
managers and board members with experience from outside the mutual sector, and the 
number of board members with expertise related solely to the house purchase, such as 
surveyors and solicitors declined. The introduction of personnel from plc backgrounds 
contributed to a wider cultural change in management, and mutual building societies 
began to behave in a similar manner to banks, growing more rapidly, building up 
surpluses and increasing managerial pay (Barnes and Ward, 1999; Llewellyn, 1997a; 
1997b; 1999; Drake, 1998). A Senior Manager in 1998 recalled the change as follows: 
 
When the Building Societies Act came in 1986, as of 1987 the word 
profitability existed for the first time ... as opposed to surplus of income over 
expenditure, stick it in the reserves. So people said ‘ooh profitability’, and that 
took them down the appropriate commercial road. ‘Well if we’re a business 
and now it is expected to make profits and maintain capital ratios we’ve got to 
have people from plc worlds that are used to doing that type of thing.’ Because 
it was a cartel, don’t forget, which finished in I think 1983.  So then, ‘ooh 
crumbs, we are competing with these, we are not just cosy lunch clubs 
anymore’ ... That doesn’t happen anymore, life is tough, we are one wolf pack 
against another wolf pack (Convertor Building Society, Authors’ Interview, 
1998). 
 
Barnes and Ward (1999) compared the outcome of this deregulation favourably with 
the similar regulatory changes in the United States which helped produce the Savings 
and Loans crisis, arguing UK deregulation was more successful because while 
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building societies were provided with more managerial leeway, regulation continued 
to limit the activities they could undertake and their freedom to get into financial 
trouble or ‘loot’ the organisation. However, Barnes and Ward did not fully foresee the 
way in which demutualisation in the UK could be exploited to achieve regulatory 
arbitrage, avoiding the constraints imposed by building society legislation. 
 
Nigel Lawson, a primary architect of financial de-regulation, first as Financial 
Secretary to the Treasury and then Chancellor of the Exchequer, acknowledged, “Any 
radical reform … is likely to bring about unforeseen side effects” (Lawson, 1992; 
quoted in Gentle et al, 1994; 185), and so, with hindsight, it is evident that the most 
crucial change in the 1986 Act was allowing demutualisation where management 
deemed it commercially beneficial. Initially designed to give a “handful” of societies 
greater freedom to diversify and provide further competition for banks (Boleat, 1987; 
34), poorly drafted conversion provisions in the 1986 Act were exploited in the courts 
by management from the larger building societies to permit them to demutualise 
following a special resolution passed by 75% of share account holders (depositors) on 
a minimum turnout of 20% (later increased to 50%) and a simple majority of 
borrowers (Oxford Centre for Mutual and Employee-owned Business, 2009: 34).   
 
Between 1989 and 2000, 11 of the 15 largest building societies demutualised 
involving approximately two-thirds of the total assets of the sector (Table 2). Given 
that they had been granted greater operational freedom, why did the larger societies 
demutualise? Stephens (2001) suggests management motivation was pivotal, and 
Perks (1991) indicates at Abbey National senior managers controlled the 
demutualisation   debate and commanded the resources to determine the outcome. For 
management, it was a very short step from operating more commercially as outlined 
above to conversion, as a Senior Manager in a convertor indicated in 1998, 
 
Both the Halifax and the Leeds had run themselves on fairly tight profitability 
grounds before. Kind of pseudo-plc habits because of credit ratings. The better 
you run the business and the better the credit rating you get, therefore the 
cheaper your wholesale funds. But why was that the case, why would you 
want cheaper retail funds? Well in order to improve profits. Why do we want 
more profits as a building society? Ah, that’s when you start to get on the 
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bridge between mutuals and plc and that’s where objectives take over … It’s 
that the management team in place at the time fancies being a plc … What 
management wants to do gets done (Authors’ Interview).  
 
Access to external capital, to grow the company by diversifying into new lines of 
business under the lighter touch and more responsive banking regulation were most 
frequently cited in public as the reasons for demutualisation (Marshall et al, 2003). 
Another view was that mutual building societies were an outdated form that had been 
superseded by the more modern joint stock company (Birchall, 2001), and 
demutualisation was part of a political project seeking to create a share-owning 
democracy (Perks, 1991). Maintaining control of the business was a defensive reason 
for demutualisation because after conversion companies had two year protection from 
hostile takeover (Marshall et al, 1997). However, convertor management typically 
sought the opportunity to lead the organisation on the wider stage of the mainstream 
financial sector in a situation where pay was closely linked to business performance 
and conversion allowed them significantly to boost their status and earnings (Marshall 
et al, 2003; Howcroft, 1999). Describing the conversion process at the end of the 
1990s, a Senior Manager in a former building society commented,  
 
Greed is an enormous driver. I’m not particularly greedy and money is not one 
of my gods but there are people who think, ‘plc, share options, millionaire, 
ooh’. These things have an effect; they are never spoken about openly and 
they are never written down (Authors’ Interview, 1998).  
 
There were numerous examples where share options and cash bonuses were awarded 
to management as part of the conversion process (Cook et al, 2001). Following 
conversion management salaries in convertors grew more like the banks and 
substantially faster than the remaining mutual building societies, so pay increases 
associated with the move to a plc appeared to influence conversion (Shiwakoti et al, 
2005). In sum, then, we conclude that though a number of factors were involved in 
individual demutualisation decisions, strong financial incentives for management to 
convert were a dominant consideration and, furthermore, by offering payments to 
building society members from historically accumulated reserves, management also 
convinced them to vote for conversion. Towards the end of the round of 
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demutualisation speculative individual investors began proactively to press for 
conversion and a subsequent financial windfall. Nevertheless, management still 
remained the key to change, and in the Nationwide, Britannia, Chelsea, Skipton and 
Portman Building Societies, successfully resisted attempts to force them to 
demutualise. Even in the case of Bradford and Bingley where speculative investors 
overturned a Board decision to remain mutual, the vote did not reach the required 
minimum to force conversion, so again management made the final decision to 
convert. Figure 1 shows the extent to which the geographical outcome of this process 
of demutualisation was regionally biased, with 74% of the employment and 70% of 
the assets of the convertors based at head offices outside London and the South East 
and only Abbey National and Alliance and Leicester, two of the early convertors, 
headquartered in London. Thus, the deregulation and demutualisation process, and the 
changes in managerial money culture associated with it, connected formerly separate 
regionally-based mutual financial circuit of capital more firmly into the business 
culture of the City of London.   
 
4: Northern Rock: From mutual roots to a regionally inscribed high growth 
business model 
 
In this section, we refine the focus by using interview and secondary source material 
to provide a geographically-informed account of Northern Rock’s evolution from 
demutualisation in 1997 to collapse in 2007. A strategic-relational analysis highlights 
the path shaping role of Northern Rock’s location and previous development in the 
North East of England which explains the precise way in which the national 
regulatory changes outlined in the previous section drew Northern Rock, a regionally-
embedded institution, shaped by local elite interests and histories, into wider 
international financial markets and, in so doing, extended the City of London to part 
of North East England. It is important to stress, though, that we do not argue for the 
geographical uniqueness of Northern Rock, or provide a locational explanation for the 
crisis in the company. As previously suggested, Northern Rock’s business model had 
much in common with other banks, reflecting its participation in the wider 
transformation in corporate cultures outlined in the previous section. Rather, by 
indicating the geographical influences on Northern Rock’s corporate strategies and 
business model, we show why the company’s business model assumed such an 
 19 
extreme form of high growth and excessive wholesale funding. We also show that the 
company’s growth and decline was shaped by the North East region’s previous role in 
spatial divisions of labour and thus perpetuates established forms of uneven 
development. Through these insights we develop a fuller analysis of Northern Rock’s 
participation in the credit crunch than contained in placeless accounts of a reckless 
bank.    
 
A geographically sensitive analysis indicates the regionally-embedded character of 
Northern Rock contributed to its demise. Northern Rock was a long-established and 
leading regional institution in the North East of England. At the turn of the 20
th
 
century the Northern Counties Building Society (one of the precursors to Northern 
Rock) was: 
 
[U]nquestionably one of Newcastle’s established institutions. When the 
society held its 50th anniversary Jubilee Dinner …. The guest list was a roll 
call of the North East’s civic establishment. Amongst those invited were: the 
Mayor and Sheriff of Newcastle, the Mayor of Gateshead, the Under-Sheriff 
of Newcastle, the MPs for Newcastle, Gateshead and Tyneside, the Recorder 
of Newcastle, the Bishop of Newcastle, the chairmen and secretaries of the 
Newcastle, Grainger and Universal Building Societies, the presidents of the 
Law Society and Northern Architects Union, the chairman of the Tyne 
Commissioners, and the editors of the Newcastle Journal, the Chronicle, the 
Leader and the Morning Mail” (Aris, 2000; 60). 
 
In a tradition that goes back to Northern Rock’s foundation, which the company 
history describes as a merger between the “cavaliers” or local aristocracy and the 
“roundheads” or local bourgeoisie (Aris, 2000; 89), the chairmanship of the board was 
assumed by the local aristocracy and other well-heeled families on Tyneside,  
principally the Ridley family dynasty (Brummer, 2008; 8). Northern Rock’s corporate 
evolution is replete with examples of senior executives playing a prominent role in the 
region. Osborn, the first Chief Executive, is described as a “major figure in the affairs 
of the North East …. a man who wanted to exercise his power and found a provincial 
area in which he could exercise it across a very wide range” (Aris, 2000; 102-103). 
By 2000, other senior executives at Northern Rock were established building society 
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men, with a long history in the company and little experience of the wider financial 
sector, mixed with non-executive City of London-types close to the new originate and 
securirize business. This regionally embedded character resulted in “an ‘amateur’ 
element” (Brummer, 2008; 7) engrained in the way in which the company was run 
which was subsequently exposed by the Treasury Committee.  
 
In 1996, Northern Rock was one of the more commercially-minded institutions, and 
senior management regarded themselves as “the most efficient society of them all,” 
but they also believed the mortgage market had undergone a significant 
transformation, “the market is oversupplied;” branch banking was “doomed to 
failure;” “a lot of people [will] fail;” and to be successful Northern Rock had to grow 
rapidly and “drive cost out of the system” (Senior Manager, Authors’ Interview, 
1998). However, as a mutual the growth of the organisation was limited by lack of 
access to external capital because growing fast on narrow margins in highly 
competitive markets would “quickly burn into regulatory capital” (Senior Manager, 
Authors’ Interview, 1998). In the resulting demutualisation the historical roots of the 
company in North East England had an important influence and acknowledging them 
enabled management to push conversion through. The company history records that 
when Northern Rock was making the decision to convert to plc status, “[T]he balance 
of power in the boardroom was tipped in favour of management. ‘By that time 
management was quite powerful.’ … [But] ... It was the idea of a Northern Rock 
Charitable Foundation that swung the board round” (Aris, 2000; 135). By establishing 
a Foundation with a deed to allocate 5% of annual pre-tax profit to good causes in 
North East England, management cemented relations with the regional community 
and by appealing to Northern Rock’s tradition of local community involvement 
convinced both the board and members of the society to approve conversion.  
 
In its ‘Proposals and Rationale for Conversion’ Northern Rock (1997; 26) promised a 
“policy of high growth.” Geography was intimately implicated in the development of 
this ultimately flawed high growth business model.  The location of the company in 
North East England, a low cost location for mortgage production, was perceived by 
management to be central to its competitive advantage, and was reflected in its 
publicity: 
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Northern Rock is the lowest cost producer in the banking industry in Europe. 
A key advantage over rivals is that its head office and key operational units are 
located in the North East of England where wages are, on average, lower than 
in the rest of the UK. The cost of living is much lower in this area, so people 
are able to enjoy a high standard of living even though income may be lower. 
Northern Rock is then able to pass this advantage of low costs to its customers 
(http://companyinfo.northernrock.co.uk/downloads/results/NorthernRockFinal
V2.pdf) 
 
Though Northern Rock continued after demutualisation as a mortgage bank, like 
thrifts in the US after significant regulatory relaxation it diversified its sources of 
funding. New forms of funding were in management’s view needed to overcome the 
perceived disadvantage of their regional location: “In essence the problem was how 
could a society as aggressive as Northern Rock continue to develop its mortgage 
business when the main focus of its activities was in the North and most of the action 
was in the South” (Aris, 2000; 130). The answer was to replace its traditional business 
model, where deposits and mortgages were predominantly raised locally with a new 
model providing mortgages remotely via post, telephone and computer to the more 
buoyant housing markets further south (by 2007 approximately half of Northern 
Rock’s lending was placed in markets in the South of England; Milne and Wood, 
2008), and drawing finance for expansion from the international wholesale money 
markets. 
 
The switch toward wholesale funding was portrayed as transformational for the 
company:   
 
From our point of view, as a mortgage bank, although currently 50% of our 
funding is via the savings market it doesn’t have to be. We can go totally 
wholesale; we can operate on the international bond markets and needn’t be a 
bank at all. We could become a securitizer, and so we merely turn loans into 
securitised notes, sell them on the international bond markets and we wouldn’t 
need savings at all …. If you have not got it as an asset on your balance sheet 
you don’t need the capital to back it. You don’t need to be a bank, that’s what 
I’m saying (Senior Manager, Northern Rock, Authors’ Interview, 1998). 
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At the Merrill Lynch European Banking and Insurance Conference in 2003, Adam 
Applegarth (2003; 14), Chief Executive of Northern Rock, confirmed this earlier 
vision of a mortgage bank funded via securitisation had been consolidated into a 
“unique and successful business model” as a “low cost mortgage bank” focused on 
delivering high returns for investors via “a virtuous circle” of cost control, 
competitive products and high quality asset growth based on a “well-balanced funding 
platform” of wholesale, securitised notes and retail funds “to succeed on narrow 
margins”. Northern Rock’s approach was similar to that of specialist lenders such as 
GMAC-RCF (General Motors Acceptance Corporation) which the then Executive 
Chairman Stephen Knight, described as a “creator and trader of mortgage assets” 
providing “mortgages for everyone delivered in a fast, automated process” (Knight, 
2006; 14). Northern Rock, like such institutions, broadened the mortgage market 
through simplification of the mortgage selling process via self-certification, offering 
low interest rate mortgages and purchasing near sub-prime mortgages from 
intermediaries such as Lehman Brothers.  
 
Thus, Northern Rock was drawn by the wider forces of spatial integration in the 
financial sector and over-confidence reflecting its amateur management into a classic 
speculative bubble similar to accounts of the stock market crash in 1929 where a 
pervasive sense of confidence and optimism, resulted in a boom and then a crash 
when the economy and stock market turned (Galbraith, 1992; 187). In the current 
context, Northern Rock and other commercial banks believed they were like 
“medieval alchemists … converting base metals into gold” (Stiglitz, 2008; 4), and, as 
in 1929 where leverage and easy credit was “heralded as the financial innovation of 
the age” (Galbraith, 1992; 10), they naively thought they could use it to develop a 
money-making machine (Haldane, 2009). Northern Rock was advised by JP Morgan 
— which features prominently in Tett’s (2009) account of the origins of the financial 
innovations that led to the credit crunch — on how they could maintain their regional 
roots while becoming “part of a much more interesting world” (Aris, 2000; 134). The 
culture of conservatism that had dominated while Northern Rock was a building 
society, reflecting its origins in a regional backwater of the financial sector in North 
East England, was replaced by a more entrepreneurial and risky approach to the 
mortgage business. Senior Management at Northern Rock became one of the primary 
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exponents of the entrepreneurial, securitization-based, plc model and argued for its 
superiority over the more regulated mutual form that characterised the remaining 
building societies. In evidence to the All-Party Parliamentary Group for Building 
Societies and Financial Mutuals (2006; 8-9):  
 
The company [Northern Rock] told the Inquiry that its subsequent high growth 
and continually falling cost ratios had enabled it to price its products more 
competitively. The most important metric, it said, was its net interest margin – 
the difference between the average rate paid by savers and the average rate 
charged to borrowers. This, Northern Rock said, had been cut from 1.86% to 
0.8% during 1997-2004. It insisted that its success over the past eight years 
would not have been possible under the old mutual model. By being able to 
access external capital (75% of which is now raised abroad) it could grow 
quickly and therefore keep unit costs down. Northern Rock said its cost 
income ratio was now 30.4% compared to an average of over 53% for building 
societies and argued that this proved it was ‘clear that mutual status does not 
encourage efficiency. We gained our cost efficiency by rapid growth and 
ensuring our costs increased below the rate of income growth and half the rate 
of asset growth’ it told the Inquiry.’ 
 
In their 2007 evidence to the Treasury Committee (2008: 16), the Northern Rock 
board argued that the possibility that all wholesale markets would be closed was 
regarded as “unforeseeable” and as a consequence they had not taken out appropriate 
liquidity risk insurance, in contrast to other institutions such as the Countrywide 
Financial Corporation in the US. They were surprised that there was “no flight to 
quality in that process [of tightening in credit markets]”. The amateurish character of 
their management resulted in Northern Rock confusing the improbable with the 
impossible and they exposed themselves to a low probability-high impact risk 
(Treasury Committee, 2008). Lauded by the City, propelled by the wider financial 
spatial integration to undertake cavalier risk taking for higher rewards, the amateur 
elite management at Northern Rock management did not fully understand the risks 
they were taking, the complex implications of the securitisation of mortgages, and the 
potential links between different parts of the mortgage business. In this lethal cocktail 
there are interesting parallels between Northern Rock and other established 
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regionally-owned manufacturing companies in North East of England, many of which 
failed in the post-war period (Robinson, 1988). Northern Rock management viewed 
the company as a “manufacturer of mortgages” and production was described in 
“factory terms” – the North East seen as a low cost location for labour intensive, low 
skill mortgage production (Senior Manager, Authors’ Interview, 1998). The final 
irony is that Northern Rock got into trouble through neglecting the wider context for 
their business, precisely the mistake that many traditional manufacturers also made, 
which raises interesting questions about the long run reproduction of uneven 
development and the impact of the regional embedding of managerial elites on this 
process. 
 
 
5: From boom to bust and bail-out at Northern Rock: Implications for a 
geographical understanding of the financial crisis 
 
What contribution does a geographical perspective make to the numerous studies of 
the Northern Rock crisis? Or, to put it another way, why and to what extent does the 
geography of finance matter in the financial bubbles and crashes of the global 
financial crisis? The paper has re-visited the crisis at Northern Rock and argued that 
the company was not simply an example of a hyper-aggressive business model 
employed by naïve management; instead, we interpret Northern Rock’s travails as a 
product of two decades of weakening regulation that transformed the money culture 
of building society management. Demutualisation liberated cautious former building 
societies such as Northern Rock, based in the regions, mutually-owned and with a 
different way of operating, and afforded them financial incentives and wholesale 
money to grow. We argue Northern Rock’s location shaped its participation in these 
wider processes of deregulation and spatial integration. The company was particularly 
susceptible to participation in the originate and securirize speculative bubble because 
financial innovation appeared to provide a means of overcoming a significant 
geographical problem — namely its peripheral position in relation to the main action 
in the housing market, and to maximising its perceived potential competitive 
advantage of being based in a low cost location for mortgage production. By 
appealing to its longstanding regional roots and through contributing to regional good 
causes and corporate sponsorship, the company established a consensus that 
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facilitated demutualisation. Through an alignment of regional elite and plc financial 
interests associated with originate and securitize forms of organisation, Northern 
Rock became an extension — albeit fragile and ultimately temporary — of a form of 
City of London-based growth. The dependence of the company on regionally-
embedded, amateur business elite that did not fully understand the business it was 
operating and the risks it was taking was central to the ultimately flawed corporate 
strategy with a high risk, extreme dependence on external funding that ultimately 
brought the company down. In sum, through analysis of the experience of Northern 
Rock we have been able to tie down the abstract space of flows that characterise the 
financial sector and demonstrate that — far from a placeless managerial failure as it 
was presented at the time (Treasury Committee, 2008) — the explanation of the crisis 
at Northern Rock is an inherently geographical story. Through engaging the 
particularity of place, we are able to explain the specific ways in which regulatory 
change, institutional evolution and social agency shaped the nature and terms of 
engagement of Northern Rock with the international financial system and the City of 
London. This place-sensitive account is unlikely to be unique to Northern Rock, the 
strong local roots of the other demutualised institutions in the UK, and the small size 
and spatial concentration of their branch networks (with the exception of the Halifax), 
which limited access to retail deposits and encouraged involvement in wholesale 
financial markets and novel forms of lending, suggests that exploring financial 
geographies will facilitate a deeper understanding of the recent banking crisis. 
 
More widely, this analysis of Northern Rock highlights the way in which the spatial 
integration of financial markets during the last thirty years has reduced the diversity 
of the geographical ecologies of finance and intensified the impact of the credit 
crunch and banking crisis (Leyshon et al, 2006). Haldane (2009) argues that a 
collective pursuit of high returns through similar business models both increased the 
homogeneity of and convergence in the financial sector and made an important 
contribution to the recent financial crisis. In 2003, Marshall et al (p.754) argued,  
 
Mutual institutions offer an important element of diversity in the personal 
financial services sector. Based outside London, with strong community ties 
and a commitment to social responsibility mutual building societies are likely 
to be more sensitive than other institutions to the needs of their local 
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communities … Their reliance on internally generated income for expansion 
also means they are not subject to the same extent to the ‘herd instinct’ that at 
times characterises other financial institutions. 
 
This insight endures and is supported by a report from the Oxford Centre for Mutual 
and Employee-owned Business (Michie et al, 2009) that argues lack of access to 
significant external sources of capital, combined with the knowledge that capital 
cannot easily be replaced, insulates mutual building societies from the short-term 
pressures of the capital market and encourages them to adopt a lower-risk and more 
sustainable approach to the business.  
 
The account of Northern Rock’s demutualisation, rapid growth, collapse and 
nationalisation, in common with the demise of other convertor building societies, has 
parallels with previous financial crises. A speculative bubble was driven by a 
pervasive sense that financial innovation had transformed the rules of the game, that 
financial leverage facilitated new and easy ways of making money, and opened up 
opportunities for significant personal financial rewards. All 11 societies that 
demutualised have subsequently lost their independent status. A number have been 
absorbed into remaining institutions (eg Woolwich became part of Barclays; Abbey 
National acquired National and Provincial and Alliance and Leicester before itself 
becoming part of Banco Santander; Halifax absorbed Birmingham Midshires and 
Leeds Permanent before ultimately becoming part of the Lloyds Banking Group), and 
the state has taken a significant stake in or nationalised other institutions. Bradford 
and Bingley’s mortgage book was nationalised in 2008, and its retail savings 
transferred to Abbey National. Lloyds Banking Group, which previously acquired the 
Cheltenham and Gloucester building society, is currently part state owned, while 
Bristol and West was acquired by the Bank of Ireland and is now no more than a 
trading name with its retail savings transferred to the Britannia Building Society. The 
latter has joined the Co-operative Banking Group, in a move potentially strengthening 
alternatives to the plc banking model. Reviewing the evidence on Northern Rock’s 
collapse in the light of the broader experience of other institutions in the sector draws 
attention to the role of diversification away from core business into areas where 
institutions had little experience, like the thrifts in the Savings and Loans crisis in the 
US. While a number of convertors failed because they diversified into new areas of 
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risky business such as commercial property and sub-prime lending, Northern Rock’s 
mistake was to diversify into new sources of risky funding. 
 
But this paper is not a eulogy for mutuality because not only was mutualism 
undermined by management and membership greed and indifference, but the financial 
crisis has also created a number of serious challenges for the remaining building 
societies. Low interest rates have put pressure on society’s interest rate margins, 
especially where loans are tied to the Bank rate. The cost of attracting wholesale 
funding has increased, and competition to attract retail funding has intensified. 
Societies have also been affected by losses associated with the deterioration of the 
commercial property and buy-to-let markets, and the collapse of the Icelandic Banks 
(HM Treasury, 2010). This increased financial stress has pressured societies to 
improve their capital base, and several, mostly smaller building societies, including 
the Barnsley, Catholic, Chelsea, Chesham, Cheshire, Derbyshire, Portman, 
Scarborough and Stroud and Swindon have been absorbed by larger societies, while 
the West Bromwich and Dunfermline have had to be rescued. Most striking was the 
Dunfermline Building Society which got into serious difficulty and was expected to 
make losses in the region of £24 million in 2008 associated primarily with 
diversification into risky commercial property, and self-certified mortgages purchased 
through Lehman Brothers and GMAC-RCF, which resulted in it being broken up with 
the Nationwide taking over the retail and wholesale deposits, head office, branches 
and the viable part of its mortgage business, while its commercial loans and acquired 
residential mortgages were placed in administration (Scottish Affairs Committee, 
2009). Marshall, et al. (2003) argued that the response of the remaining mutual 
organisations to the conversion of the larger building societies included the 
development of a more commercial approach to their business. For many this 
involved a rejuvenation of their mutual roots, providing a mutual dividend to their 
members, but some displayed behaviour similar to the institutions that had converted 
to plc banks, diversifying into new areas with higher risk profiles that were beyond 
the capacity of the organisation to support (Treasury Committee, 2009). However, as 
Barnes and Ward (1999) argued, the constraint imposed by the 50% reliance on retail 
savings required by building society legislation ultimately limited the damage. 
Nevertheless, the much reduced building society sector is now heavily dependent on 
the future of the Nationwide, which accounts for 57% of the assets, and which in June 
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2010 announced 565 job losses associated with the integration of the Derbyshire, 
Dunfermline and Cheshire societies into the company.  
 
Finally, we would like to return to the dominant geographical theme of the paper. 
Mutually owned building societies were important, established regional employers. 
Their conversion to plcs and then rapid growth has had a significant impact on 
regional financial sectors during the last two decades, and demutualisation, the credit 
crunch and banking crisis are now resulting in a round of redundancies and 
consolidation, arguably tightening their connections to the City of London. We have 
examined one of these institutions in some detail, and we conclude that there are 
interesting parallels between the new risky and illusory finance-based growth at 
Northern Rock, and previous rounds of economic development in the North East. 
Northern Rock grafted on to its existing head office and IT centre a financial call and 
administrative centre and echoed the historical role of the region in the division of 
labour where it has relied on call and administrative centres in the public and private 
sector to replace traditional heavy industrial and manufacturing branch plant decline. 
A common theme of these rounds of investment has been the reliance of the region on 
routine and relatively low cost labour of various types that is vulnerable at times of 
crisis. Thus, an important conclusion of the study is continuity in geographical 
patterns of uneven development. The paper highlights the role of corporate strategists 
and strategies in reproducing uneven development in the search for profit, and this 
reinforces our earlier insight that other geographically-inscribed accounts of the 
financial crisis are waiting to be explored. 
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Table 1: Major Changes in Legislation and Regulation affecting Building 
Societies 
 
1962 Building Societies Act - delimited the activities of building societies to mortgage 
lending using retail funding. 
1979 Ending of exchange controls. 
1980 ‘Report of the Committee on the Functioning of Financial Institutions’ argued 
collective ‘cartel’ arrangements gave building societies an artificial competitive 
advantage and had negative impacts on the mortgage markets.  
1980 Ending of the ‘corset’ (Supplementary Special Deposit Scheme) introduced to curb 
bank lending. 
1981 Scrapping of building society exemption from Competition and Credit Control 
legislation 
1981 Abolition of reserve asset requirement requiring banks to lodge at least 12.5% of their 
deposits in a specified range of liquid assets. 
1982 Ending of hire purchase restrictions. 
1983 Collapse of the building society cartel. 
1983 Building societies given access to wholesale money markets. 
1983 Building Societies Association  report ‘Future Powers of Building Societies’ argued 
they should be allowed to undertake a wider range of activities, and conceded that 
building societies should no longer operate as a cartel. 
1984 Green Paper ‘Building Societies: A New Framework’ closely followed the earlier 
BSA report. 
1986 Building Societies Act - societies allowed to diversify into new markets and 
participate in wholesale money markets up to 25% of their total deposits and 
demutualise.  Established a Building Societies Commission responsible for 
regulation. 
1986 Withdrawal of mortgage lending guidelines. 
1987 Schedule 8 clarifies Building Societies Act.  Societies able to buy life assurance 
companies, own up to 15% of a general insurance company, offer full fund 
management services and a wider range of banking services. 
1991 Composition tax on building societies deposits abolished.  Deposits charged at basic 
rate of tax. 
1994 Stage one of a review of the 1986 Act announced that new powers to be granted to 
building societies.  Societies can increase their wholesale funding limit from 40% to 
50% of funds, establish subsidiaries to make unsecured lending and the power to own 
life insurance companies. 
1995 Stage two of the review of the 1986 Act confirmed that building societies to be 
allowed to pursue any activities allowed in their memorandum of powers, so long as 
they raise at least 50% of their funds from members and at least 75% of their lending 
is secured on residential property. 
1996 Government announces it will enact legislation to reduce restrictions on building 
society activities and confirms the 50% and 70% limits on fund raising and lending.  
The new rules allow building societies to put 25% of their lending into any asset, as 
long as it is able to convince the Building Societies Commission that it has sufficient 
financial and managerial resources to take on the activity.  Societies wishing to merge 
while remaining mutuals were to be protected from hostile take-over. 
1997 A new Building Societies Act amended the 1986 Act. This was less restrictive 
concerning the principal purpose of a building society (which under the 1986 Act 
restricted societies to the making of loans which were secured on residential property 
and funded by members). The new emphasis followed more closely the legal 
frameworks set out under the Companies Act and the Banking Act. 
1999 A change to the rules regarding the voting threshold required to force a society to  
convert. For a conversion vote to be put by the Board to be passed it must have  
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support from 75% of savers, and a majority of borrowers on a 50% turnout. 
1999 Changes to secondary legislation increase the number of members required to  
propose a Member’s Resolution from 50 to a maximum of 500; to call a Special 
General Meeting from 100 to 500; to nominate a Board candidate up to 250 members 
in a large society. 
2000 Financial Services and Markets Act consolidates previous building society legislation 
and incorporates societies under the regulatory umbrella of the Financial Services 
Authority. 
 
 
 
Table 2: Demutualisation in the Building Society Industry, 1989-2000 
 
 
 
1989 Abbey National converts to a plc. 
 
1995 Lloyds Bank take-over of Cheltenham & Gloucester building society. 
 
1996 The take-over of the National & Provincial Building Society by the 
Abbey National. 
 
1997  Alliance & Leicester converts to a plc. 
 
1997 Halifax and Leeds Permanent merge and convert to a plc. 
 
1997  Woolwich converts to a plc. 
 
1997  Northern Rock converts to a plc. 
 
1997 Bristol & West take-over by the Bank of Ireland. 
 
1999   Birmingham Midshires taken-over by the Halifax. 
  
2000   Bradford and Bingley converts to a plc. 
 
 
 
Source: Building Societies Association web site 
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